Graduate Student Journal of Higher Education

Graduate Student Journal of Higher Education

Volume 1
2018

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Volume 1
2018

CONTENTS

FROM THE EDITOR

*I*t is with great honor that I introduce the first issue of the Graduate Student Journal of Higher Education. Over a year ago, a group of colleagues from West Virginia University met to contemplate ways in which original and rigorous graduate student scholarship could engage in a written conversation beyond their home academic units. We noticed that graduate students, mentored throughout their coursework by professors in the forefront of their disciplines, produce cutting-edge research; nonetheless, those pearls of creativity rarely end in a shared academic space sparkling and nurturing other ideas. The intent of this journal is facilitating a forum where graduate students around the world engage in systematic conversations and innovative thinking takes place.

Being true to our mission of advancing the discipline of higher education through a graduate student referred publication venue, the editorial board has selected for its inaugural issue two manuscripts that unpack current policy concerns in higher education, and a book review that dives into the power of academic science to drive economy.

In the first article, "A public or a private good? Financing higher education in England and Germany", Saralyn McKinnon-Crowley (University of Texas at Austin) applies the lens of critical policy studies to interrogate funding practices in both countries. This theoretical framework unveils economic and social power operating at the core of funding policies. In this comparative study, McKinnon-Crowley identifies neoliberal philosophies as drivers of certain higher education funding practices throughout the second half of the twentieth century onward. She discusses how access and persistence are affected by national and state level policy including the implications for underserved populations. The article vividly represents the tensions between opposing views of higher education, being it a public or a private good. Most importantly, McKinnon-Crowley spurs a conversation on social equity.

In the second article "Addressing campus sexual violence: An analysis of three policy participants' belief systems", Stephanie Lezotte (Rowan University) brings us back to a concerning national issue and offers an analytical tool transferable to an international context. The article begins with a careful review of risk factors, consequences, and impact of sexual violence on college campuses as well as interventions. Then, it elucidates standing public policy that specifically addresses sexual violence on college campuses (Title IX, The Clery Act, VAWA, Campus SaVE Act) and other bills that have not been enacted into law. Subsequently, Lezotte identifies groups of participants that influence sexual violence policy-making process, and analyzes their belief systems using the second tenet of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The findings reveal both commonalities and contentions among the belief systems. Unlike current literature, Lezotte proposes that intentionally grappling with those disparate belief systems and finding common ground can foster a wider support for meaningful and stable policy aimed at reducing rape and rape culture on college campuses.

> *Sexual assault on college campuses is a common problem that often goes unreported. It includes any unwanted sexual activity, from unwanted touching to rape. If you or someone you know has been sexually assaulted, it is not your fault and you are not alone. Please seek help and report the sexual assault as soon as possible.*

In the final piece, Christie Hand (West Virginia University) reviews the book Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine by Elizabeth Popp Berman (2012). The purpose of the book is to determine why market logic has become more influential in academic

science over several decades in mid-late twentieth century. Hand describes, in a precise manner, the practices in colleges and universities that evidence the shift from a science logic to a market logic including faculty entrepreneurship in the biosciences, the patenting of university inventions, and the creation of University-Industry Research Centers. These practices clearly illustrate how academic science ultimately became an economic engine in itself rather than being solely a resource for industry. According to Berman, although neoliberalism contributes to the evolution in academic science, it does not fully explain all facets of the new market logic. Instead, Berman considers economic rationalism a more appropriate lens to explain changes over time. Hand concludes her review with a depiction of Berman's ambivalent sentiment in regard to economic rationalism due to its problematic implications. Despite the financial gains, the advancement of science measured only in economic terms overshadows the value of knowledge in solving social problems.

As we complete the first issue of the Journal, we continue to reach out to over two hundred national programs in Higher Education Administration, Leadership in Postsecondary Education, College Student Development, Student Affairs, College Counseling, Academic Advising, and College Student Personnel among others; professional associations like the American Education Research Association (AERA) division J and the Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE), as well as universities worldwide. We invite them to be a part in this journey of peer collaboration.

Launching this project has been a team endeavor and a team accomplishment. I am grateful to each colleague and friend who took this challenge and contributed his or her time to this publication. On behalf of the Journal, I would like to thank the Center for the Future of Land-Grant Education for its auspice; our faculty advisers Nathan Sorber, Rodney Hughes, and Erin McHenry-Sorber for their continued support and encouragement.

I sincerely appreciate the founder editorial board's initiative, commitment, and willingness to learn the ropes: Matthew Matyasovsky, Associate Editor, oversaw the Journal processes and ensured we covered all the details. Katlin Swisher, Managing Editor, served as the Journal point of contact, managed the communication with authors, and blinded the manuscripts. Alexa Cecil served as Director of Web Operations & Online Presence and developed our website (https://gradjournal.orgs.wvu.edu).

I would also like to thank our peer reviewers whose expert and generous involvement provided invaluable feedback to authors. Their contribution is vital to the development of junior scholars. Our technical editors, Meridith Balas, Alexander Lastinger, and Amanda Rose graciously revised the manuscripts. And our visual communicators: cover designer J. Megan Edison whose creativity is beyond measure, and Kristen Uppercue who took the multiple bits and pieces of this puzzle and magically converted them into a professional layout.

My deepest gratitude goes to all authors trusting their work to us as we diligently develop a graduate student space to exchange ideas and advance our field of study. Warm regards,

Lorena Ballester

Lorena Ballester, Editor

A public or a private good? Financing higher education in England and Germany

Saralyn McKinnon-Crowley, The University of Texas at Austin

ABSTRACT

This paper interrogates the financial aid systems, policies, and procedures of Germany and England through the lens of critical policy studies. It considers the historical contexts of each system, the impact of neoliberal philosophies that led to changes in financial aid polices in the last few decades, and implications for the future. The paper argues that neoliberal assumptions about higher education as a private good in England and in Germany have created financial aid systems that use the logic of the free market to perpetuate inequities in higher education. These countries' financial decisions about who pays for higher education have real consequences for low-income, part-time, and students of color.

Who or what is responsible for financing higher education? In the 21st century, influenced by neoliberal economic concepts, European governments have answered this question in a number of ways. Some governments have chosen to finance tuition, fees, and living expenses, and others have opted to subsidize tuition and fees, but leave living expenses to students and their families. This paper will examine the financial aid systems, policies, and procedures of Germany and England through the lens of critical policy studies. It will consider the historical contexts of each system, the impact of neoliberal philosophies in each country that led to changes in their financial aid polices in the last few decades, and implications for the future. Neoliberal assumptions about higher education as a private good in England and in Germany have created financial aid systems that use the logic of the free market to perpetuate inequities in higher education. English politicians have continued its commitment to these financing systems, while Germany's has opted against them. These countries' financial decisions about who pays for higher education have real consequences for low-income, part-time, and students of color.

Theoretical Framework

Critical policy studies analysis views policy through a social justice lens and "seeks to identify and examine existing commitments against normative criteria such as social justice, democracy and empowerment" (Fischer, Torgerson, Durnová, & Orsini, 2015, p. 1). nor benign. Critical policy studies scholars, who often use a postpositivist paradigm, interrogate policy and policy analysis, and review the ways in which policies can both help and harm. Knowledge gained through critical policy studies seeks to impact the world and review how policy is enacted on the ground and influences behavior.

Nevertheless, critical policy studies is not a monolithic paradigm. The data presented here is influenced by Habermas and by Foucault's poststructural approaches and the influence of their theories on poststructural critical policy studies. Broadly speaking, poststructural critical policy studies question how efforts to hold, create, and maintain power works insidiously to perpetuate social inequities (Fischer et al., 2015). The financial aid policies in England and Germany illustrate how neoliberal policies in both countries perpetuate inequity in access to higher education.

History of Higher Education Funding: England and Germany

For those familiar with higher education funding in the United States, the policy discussion and decisions surrounding funding procedures in England and in Germany in the last 20 years resemble conversations in American higher education since the passage of the G.I. Bill (Fuller, 2014). Policymakers in England, who have historically provided tuition-free higher education to undergraduates, have significantly changed the higher education funding model through acts and policies passed in the last thirty years (Hillman, 2016). As of the 2015–16 academic year (AY), there were 525,490 full-time undergraduate students in the United Kingdom, and 148,570 part-time students (Higher Education Statistics Agency, n.d.). Approximately 2.4 million students attend higher education in Germany (Flanagan, 2016, p. 370). In 2005, the German institutional court overturned a 1976 law forbidding each of its 16 states to charge tuition (Hübner, 2009, p. 6). Six states decided to charge tuition, causing a national uproar; by 2014, all of these states had repealed their tuition implementation policies (Flanagan, 2016). This section reviews the historical funding structures of the English and the German system, and the major changes within the last twenty years.

England

In a process known as "devolution," each of the four home countries of the United Kingdom separated their governance structures; their higher education funding procedures have also diverged (Blackburn, 2016). English higher education policy has always made some financial allowance to encourage low-income participation, though the means by which and the amount of allowances have fluctuated over time. Undergraduate funding in English institutions of higher education started in 1962, and was distributed as "maintenance grants" providing cost-of-living support to low-income students (Pennell & West, 2005, p. 128). Eligibility was determined by checking student, parental, and (if applicable) student spousal income (West, Emmerson, Frayne, & Hind, 2009). Money from these grants was sent to the students, and the students' local education agency provided tuition fees to the institutions. Parents were supposed to cover any unfunded living expenses (West, Roberts, Lewis, & Noden, 2015).

1977–1992.

According to Hillman (2016), fees and living expenses for full-time undergraduate students were fully covered by the government starting in 1977, "when undergraduates from the richest households became entitled to free tuition and a small maintenance grant, until 1985, when the maintenance grants ceased to be universal" (p. 333). Though many contemporary students and their parents perceived free higher education to be a historical right, these policies only date from the second half of the twentieth century. These financial aid procedures continued until the late 1980s (Pennell, 2005). In 1988, the Education Reform Act changed the organization of the British polytechnic and teachers' colleges from local control, placing them instead under the new Polytechnic and Colleges Funding Council (Parry, 2009, p. 330). This act set the stage for future higher education reform.

The 1990 Education (Student Loans) Act changed the maintenance grants to mortgage-style loans, which require the student to pay the balance in full in monthly increments, regardless of income after graduation (West et al., 2014). At this time, higher education in England changed from an elite to a mass system (Esson & Ertl, 2016) moving from 15% enrollment of the age cohort to approximately 30% in 1992 (West et al., 2015, p. 24). Student and parental income still determined loan eligibility (Bachan, 2014; West et al., 2009). The loans accrued interest based on inflation rates, and the amount of monthly loan payment was determined by post-graduation earnings (West et al., 2009). Any education expenses not covered by governmental contributions were paid for by the student through bursaries (grants for living expenses and class necessities, like textbooks) or grants and scholarships from other sources (Bachan, 2014).

The Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 promoted the polytechnic universities in England, which are often called the new or post-1992 universities, to full university status (Bachan, 2014). These policy changes were specifically designed to increase access to low-income families and first-generation college students, setting the ambitious goal of 50% higher education enrollment for 17 to 30-year-old students by 2010 (Bachan, 2014, p. 848). New universities are often considered to be of lower quality than the older institutions of higher education, and are contrasted with the 20 prestigious research universities called "The Russell Group" (Callender, 2010, p. 52). After 1990, maintenance grants for attendees of new and Russell Group institutions alike were locked in at the 1990 amounts and incrementally phased out in favor of loans until the 1996-97 AY, at which time half of the students received grants and half received loans (Pennell & West, 2005, p. 128).

1997–2003.

After a document called the Dearing Report was released in 1997 by the Labour government, the mortgage loans for living expenses requiring incremental payment were changed to income-contingent loans, effective during the 1998-99 AY, known as "top-up fees" (Esson & Ertl, 2016, p. 1267). The maintenance grant was completely discontinued. Though the government still provided loans for living expenses, each student was required to pay £1000 annually toward their tuition (Johnes, 2007, p. 385). As an unintended consequence of the policy, this increase in expected student expenditures caused a decrease in university applications from low-income students, students of color, and single parents (Esson & Ertl, 2016). Prior to the implementation of the 2004 Higher Education Act, students' required yearly tuition contributions had risen to a total of £1175 (Johnes, 2007, p. 385).

2004-2010.

The 2004 Higher Education Act, implemented in 2006-07, marked a shift in institutional governance of universities. Though England has a strongly centralized higher education sector, with national rather than local control, the 2004 Act gave institutions the power to set their own tuition fees of up to £3,000 per student per year (Johnes, 2007, p. 385). Students could receive non-interest-bearing government loans to fund this tuition fee; the funding amount would increase only based on inflation rates. Repayment rates were set at 9% of student post-graduation income, as long as they made more than £17,000 yearly in salary (Ward & Douglass, 2006, p. 16). Maintenance grants were brought back in limited fashion. Higher education institutions charging the maximum amount to students also had to provide low-income students with £300 bursaries to defray living expenses (Callender, 2010, p. 46).

Student grants were reintroduced in 2006, and the maximum salary required to receive full maintenance grants was raised to £17,500 (Callender, 2008, pp. 373-374). Unexpectedly, under the 2006 system only students from higher income backgrounds were less likely to enroll in higher education (Harrison, Chudry, Waller, & Hatt, 2015). The next significant change in English higher education dates to 2008, when the income required to receive the maximum maintenance grant amount of £2,825 increased from £17,500 to £25,000. Families with annual income between £25,000 and £60,000 could receive partial living costs grants (Callender, 2008, p. 374). By 2010, annual fees were capped at £3,290 (Carasso & Gunn, 2015, p. 72). These fees and their increases had real consequences for student debt. Esson and Ertl (2016) estimate that "students graduating in 2010 or 2011 were estimated to be in debt by an average amount of £23,000 and £24,700, respectively" as opposed to the 2008 graduating class debt of £7,783 (p. 1267). This system of higher education financing was short-lived.

2010-present.

In 2010, English politicians' attitudes toward higher education tuition and fees shifted. A policy paper published in October 2010, called Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education, suggested that higher education funding was untenable, and that institutions should be free to set their own tuition caps, but with extra review required for institutions charging over £6,000 yearly (Carasso & Gunn, 2015, p. 72). As a result of the report, the newly elected Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, "performed a spectacular u-turn by breaking his [signed 2010] pledge…to vote against raising university tuition fees" (Bhopal, 2016, p. 502). In addition to the tuition increase, under this system the rate of interest for student tuition loans could increase up to 3% for students based on their post-graduation income, and students were required to repay the loans once their annual salary reached £21,000; debt would be forgiven after 30 years (Migali, 2012, p. 873). Students and their families who made less than £25,000 a year could receive maintenance grants of up to £3,250, but were ineligible for any grants if they possessed a yearly income of £42,975 (Carasso, 2014, p. 35). Bachan (2014) finds that these changes to English higher education policy makes higher education students in the United Kingdom the fourth most indebted in the world, behind only Sweden, Canada, and the United States (p. 853).

Politically, this increase was problematic for Clegg's progressive Liberal Democrats party due to their historical pro-student attitude. Starting in AY 2012-13, students were required to pay fees up to £9,000. Institutions could charge more than the recommended amount of £6,000 yearly, as long as they set an agreement with the Office of Fair Access and the National Scholarship Programme (NSP) (Carasso, 2014). After Parliament's decision to increase the fees, students held "angry and violent protests" in both England and the rest of the United Kingdom (Bhopal, 2016, p. 502). In an attempt to regain political goodwill after the 2010 change, Nick Clegg created the National Scholarship Programme (NSP), which provided more money to low-income students, totaling £50 million in aid (Carasso, 2014, p. 36). The NSP went into effect in 2012-13, but was ultimately disbanded in 2015 due to its inflexible dispensation of low-income student funding to institutions (universities who served more low-income students received the same amount of money as institutions serving high-income students) (Carasso & Gunn, 2015). Policymakers in England attempted to make provisions for low-income students through the NSP and continued financial support for living expenses, but the NSP failed to serve its purpose. English policies, despite their stated purpose, have not ensured equal access and persistence in higher education for low-income, part-time, and students of color.

[2] Scholarship and policy in English higher education does not maintain the same distinction between the terms "tuition" and "fees" as American higher education does.

Germany

In contrast with the English system, the German model of funding undergraduate education is straightforward and relatively unchanging. Most German universities are public, and funding for students attending these institutions comes from the Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz (BAFöG), established by law to provide grant and loan aid to students each month (Flanagan, 2016; Kroth, 2013). Students qualify for the BAFöG based on their or their families' incomes, net wealth, and dependent information; as of 2013 the monthly income threshold to receive the maximum BAFöG funding was €1,605 (Kroth, 2013, p. 155). In 1990, the BAFöG changed from a loan-only program to a grant and loan program (Baumgartner & Steiner, 2005). BAFöG distribution is evaluated yearly by calculating student and parental income and wealth, subtracting the minimum amount for living expenses determined by the government, and comparing the resulting amount to the financial burden of higher education and living expenses. If the students' needs are not met by their own income, the government provides aid (Glocker, 2011).

As of 1976 the Hochschulrahmengesetz federal law forbade public institutions from charging tuition. German states charged students €75 per semester; students enrolled for longer periods (more than seven to nine semesters) paid more money in fees (Bruckmeier & Wigger, 2014; Glocker, 2011). Higher education students also received discounted fares for public transportation, enabling physical access to their instructional institutions (Hübner, 2009). As of 2005, the German high court determined that the law interfered with states' rights "to determine their higher education policies autonomously" (Hübner, 2009, p. 6). Under the German constitution, tuition fees could still be banned in states, but decisions about fees had to be determined by individual state governments. In response to this decision, seven of the 16 German states decided to implement fees. Table 1 below displays these states and their fee implementation.

Each of the states has since banned these fees. In addition to the introduction of fees, the German government implemented a public student loan program. In an attempt to increase access to higher education, students who had dependents or were considered to have disability status were exempt from paying tuition (Bruckmeier & Wigger, 2014). Unlike England, the German experiment with private funding for public higher education was brief. German financial aid policy does, however, resemble England in other ways. As a critical policy studies analysis shows, under the guise of promoting efficiency and standardization in public policy, neoliberal polices have actually created inequities for English students and potentially harmed German ones.

English and German Financial Inequities

Neoliberal philosophies are responsible for changes in higher education in England and in Germany in the last 20 years. Like academic capitalism, which argues that the educational mission of the university has been replaced by the search for profit (Simons, Haverhals, & Biesta, 2007), neoliberal philosophies replace the language of teaching, research, and inquiry in universities with terms like "performance-based budgeting" and "accountability" (Rhoades & Sporn, 2002, p. 374). Higher education has ceased to be viewed as a public good and instead is considered a private good. English policy makers rationalize placing the burden of tuition and fees onto students and their families through referencing a "graduate premium," an increase in life-long earnings for undergraduate degree holders (Bathmaker, Ingram, & Waller, 2013, p. 725; Harrison & Agnew, 2016, p. 335). The government encouraged universities in England to improve their rankings, increase efficiency, and cut costs to students in order to increase their market share, and some students have taken on a consumer orientation to higher education as a result (Budd, 2017).

In Germany, by contrast, a university degree is considered fungible – a degree from one university is equivalent to a degree in another (Budd, 2017). The market logic impacting English higher education has not been fully absorbed in Germany, though the neoliberal concept called New Public Management that "involves strengthening market-orientation and competition, management concepts from private industry, decentralized structures with increased freedom for individuals and units, and output control and assessment" has taken root in German policy (Rhoades & Sporn, 2002, p. 374). In other words, neoliberal philosophies treat education as a resource to be bought and sold on the open market. Fees, rankings, and satisfaction surveys—all hallmarks of neoliberalism— encourage students to position themselves as consumers of the goods and services of higher education, though this is not always an effective tactic in jockeying for student dollars. Budd (2017) suggests that the "relative structural rigidity of the German and English university systems have hindered the advance of neoliberalism in the former and enabled it in the latter" (p. 27). The neoliberal approach to students as customers in pursuit of eventual wealth is accepted in England but rejected in Germany. How do these neoliberal philosophies impact access and equity in higher education in each country?

England and Financial Aid Policy: Who is Harmed?

The financing policy changes for higher education in England had consequences for underrepresented students, especially part-time and low-income ones. The 1997 policy change and its introduction of top-up fees made provisions for part-time students, and allowed them to receive government financial support for the first time.

According to Callender (2011), "it is presumed that because part-time students are older and in paid employment, they do not require financial help from the government, or that their employers will pay for their studies" (p. 477), an inaccurate assumption that prevents these students from receiving help for which full-time students are eligible in loan form. Part-time students, who almost all have employment during the academic year, have lower grades and are less likely to complete a degree than their full-time counterparts (Callender, 2008; Humphrey, 2006; Pennell & West, 2005). The 2004 Higher Education Act, unlike the 1997 changes, did not provide any funding opportunities for part-time students (Callender, 2011). Furthermore, part-time students were ineligible for the grant allowed to students through the 2008 changes, unless they were enrolled more than half-time (Callender, 2011). In the post-2010 era, part-time, low-income students became eligible for tuition grants up to £1,230 and maintenance grants of up to £265 (Callender, 2011, p. 481). As Shaw (2014) expresses, it is "ironic" that "part-time students [now receiving] parity in terms of funding with full-time students – has only happened at the point at which full tuition fees have come to be required" (p. 842). Part-time students are doubly disadvantaged under the current system because the government prioritizes full-time students and does not give half-time students half tuition (Callender, 2011).

In addition to the financial inequities faced by part-time students, studies have shown that the introduction of student debt has impacted lower-income student participation in higher education (Carasso, 2014). As of 2015, an estimated 95% of English students possess loans (Harrison & Agnew, 2016, p. 333). Bhopal (2016) writes, "as a consequence of the introduction of student loans and tuition fees, there has been a considerable increase in levels of student debt, with those from poorer backgrounds experiencing greater levels of debt compared with those from more affluent backgrounds" (p. 502). Contrary to the intent of the recent education reforms, when pursuing higher education, lower-income students are harmed more than higher-income students. Lower-income students are more likely to be debt-averse and therefore more likely to avoid higher education (Pennell & West, 2005). Though lower-income students are eligible for grants and bursaries, the receipt of these methods of funding does not impact these students' attitudes toward debt (Bachan, 2014). Bursary receipt did, however, lead to lower reported levels of anxiety for low-income students, providing them with more mental energy for their studies (West et al., 2009). Similarly, lower-income students are more likely to work jobs unrelated to their degree while enrolled in higher education, detrimentally impacting both their campus involvement and future work opportunities (Bathmaker, Ingram, & Waller, 2013; Budd, 2017). Under the recent funding structure changes, besides low-income students, single parents, Muslim students, and

students of color are all likely to be opposed to accruing debt to pay for higher education, though this attitude has not necessarily lead to a decrease in participation for them (Carasso, 2014; Pennell & West, 2005). Bhopal's (2016) work, focusing on women from Asian backgrounds participating in higher education, has found that students from minority ethnic groups in England are debt-averse and more likely to choose new institutions close to home, and "continue to face inequality at all stages of the higher education experience; they are less likely to be satisfied with the student experience, more likely to leave early and less likely to gain a good honours degree than their White counterparts" (p. 503). Choosing institutions near their homes, which are often the lower-prestige new schools, exacerbates the educational segregation already extant in British secondary education (Croxford & Raffe, 2013; Humphrey, 2006). Women students are more likely to express anxiety related to the accrual and repayment of debt, which could lead to a decrease in higher education participation (Harrison & Agnew, 2016; Kettley, Whitehead, & Raffan, 2008). These financial policies in England harm the most vulnerable population of students seeking higher education. During the brief interval in which German students were required to pay for their higher education, some studies showed that lower-income students faced similar inequities.

German Access and Equity in Higher Education

In contrast to the English system, the German policy response to neoliberal educational philosophies was temporary. Some studies conducted on the population of students impacted by this change revealed some disparities in access based on income, but not all findings agreed. German students could receive exemptions from the relatively modest €1000 maximum tuition payment if they had dependents or had disabilities (Bruckmeier & Wigger, 2014). Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014), who found that enrollment in German higher education institutions was not affected by the introduction of tuition, suggest that the low fee had a low impact on student enrollment rates. Because German students are not as sensitive to institutional rankings as English students are, however, German students from the seven impacted states were able to enroll in another tuition-free state without any opportunity cost or loss of institutional prestige (Budd, 2017; Dwenger, Storck, & Wrohlich, 2012).

Contrary to Bruckmeier and Wigger (2014), Kroth's (2013) aggregation of German literature studying tuition fees found that lower-income students had a 45% likelihood of enrolling in higher education after fees were introduced, compared to 52% prior to fee introduction (p. 159). Hübner's (2009) study found that students were nearly three percent less likely to enroll in higher education after the introduction of fees, an amount he considered statistically significant (p. 3). Dwenger, Storck, and

Wrohlich (2012) found that students whose own state charged tuition fees were less likely to enroll in higher education than in tuition-free states. Like English students, German students from lower-income families were responsive to increases in aid. Baumgarter and Steiner (2005) found that higher amounts given in student aid correspondingly increased the rate of higher education enrollment for lower-income students. Steiner and Wrohlich's (2012) findings also indicate that an increase in higher education BAFöG aid was a positive incentive for student enrollment, particularly for students whose parents were lower-income, though students with higher socioeconomic status are still more likely to attain access to higher education in Germany (de Rudder, 1999; Ringe, 2009).

Students who received aid in Germany were more likely to finish a degree and did so more quickly than those without aid (Glocker, 2011). Similar to English students, German students from low-income backgrounds were averse to financing higher through loans and debt accrual (Kroth, 2013). Flanagan (2016) views the removal of tuition fees as a way for the German government to decrease income as a barrier to higher education access, a result partially supported by the data. When they began to implement fees, German state policy attempted to make accommodations for vulnerable student populations through the aid program, but may have instead harmed their access to higher education.

Differing Reactions to Neoliberalism and Policy Implications

While England has wholeheartedly embraced the neoliberal philosophy of education as a private good, as demonstrated by universities adopting rankings, fees, and free-market competition, some German institutions of higher education tried and rejected student tuition fees over a period of seven years. A critical policy analysis indicates that the flaws with approaching higher education solely as an instrument for accruing wealth leads to cognitive dissonance for some English students, who view higher education as a necessity for getting a well-paying job, but also perceive their student loans as irrelevant to their financial future because they will never earn sufficient income to pay back their debts, an attitude Esson and Ertl (2016) directly attribute to neoliberal philosophies (p. 1277). Mortgage loans rather than the income-contingent loans used in England and Germany allow students to repay their debt more easily, a finding with implications for United States financial aid policy (Chapman & Sinning, 2014; Migali, 2012; Vandenberghe & Debande, 2007). The data indicate that neoliberal philosophies as enacted through English policy has had a detrimental impact on low-income and part-time students, and students of color, and this is likely to continue into the future. In Germany in particular, the policies of the Social-Democratic Party may have contributed to a countrywide commitment to higher education access (Conradt, 2018; Fuchs, 2017). German students have endured neoliberal impositions on education and opted against an instrumental view of higher education, mitigating the negative impact of these tuition policies on low-income student enrollment.

Conclusion

Germany and England present two different responses to the influence of neoliberal philosophies upon higher education. Under this philosophy, higher education has ceased to be conceptualized as a public good and instead is seen as a private good. Because the graduate wage premium received by college degree holders is seen to be an individual benefit, students and their families are believed to be responsible for funding that premium. Students accrue debt while pursuing degrees as advanced payment for future wages. In the last thirty years, England has gone from a policy of no tuition and provision of living expenses for its students to one in which its students possess the fourth highest levels of debt in the world. As a critical policy analysis of the English system indicates, though their policies are couched in the language of free market ideology and open access, their approach to higher education financing in fact decreases the abilities of low-income, part-time, and students of color to participate in higher education. By contrast, German institutions in seven states briefly attempted to charge students tuition, but by 2014 each state had abolished this policy. Though it is unclear what the future holds for each system of higher education, the evidence indicates that the English system will continue to foster inequity in access to and persistence in higher education, and the German system will not.

Addressing campus sexual violence: An analysis of three policy participants' belief systems

Stephanie Lezotte, Rowan University

ABSTRACT

Much of the existing literature on campus sexual violence public policy focuses on institutional compliance, legal issues, and/or campus interventions. This paper reviews public policy that addresses campus sexual violence and explores contention among three groups that influence policy formation colleges and universities, the nonprofit RAINN, and law enforcement agencies by examining their belief systems using the second tenant of the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Analysis uncovers two major areas of contention: investigatory jurisdiction and mandatory reporting to law enforcement. This article suggests that examining and understanding policy participants' belief systems is an important but overlooked component in finding common ground to support meaningful campus sexual violence legislation.

Sexual violence on college campuses has been widely publicized through academic research, mass media, and government reports. Approximately 20% of females and 2% of males will be victims of sexual assault in college (Fedina, Holmes, & Backes, 2018; Krebs et al., 2016). LGBTQIA+ students are at an even greater risk (Coulter & Rankin, 2017; Fedina et al., 2018). A common misconception is that most sex crimes are randomly committed against an unsuspecting stranger. But this is not the reality. Research has found that between 70-90% of sex crimes are perpetrated by an acquaintance, someone the victim does not believe is a threat (Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000; Truman & Langton, 2015). Sexual violence is so pervasive on U.S. campuses that there is a term for the period in which most sex crimes occur: the red zone. This phrase captures the period during the early weeks of the fall semester when college students, particularly females, are most vulnerable to acts of sexual violence (Kimble, Neacsiu, Flack, and Horner, 2008).

While acquaintance rape is the most prevalent form of campus sexual violence, there are also agents who actively promote harmful beliefs about sexuality and violence. Victim blaming, belief in rape myths, and acceptance of rape culture are forms of aggression that have long been normalized in American society, and by proxy, college campuses (Herman, 1988). Victim blaming occurs when a victim's moral character is questioned due to their style of clothing, alcohol consumption, or party attendance. Those who engage in victim blaming look for reasons that might "explain" why someone was raped. Even college representatives engage in victim blaming. The University of Wisconsin Madison police department revised a safety bulletin that stated, "If you present yourself as easy prey, then expect to attract some wolves," and "A victim looks like a victim," associating behavior and physical appearance to

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the likelihood of attracting violence (Savidge, 2014). Acceptance of rape myths has been empirically documented since Burt's (1980) seminal work. She found that many Americans believed in rape myths beyond victim blaming, such as the expectation of female sexual conservatism, rape as a form of payback or punishment, and the desire to call attention to oneself through false claims of rape. Widespread acceptance of rape myths promotes a rape culture that pervades college campuses. For example, a Yale University fraternity was suspended when some of their members chanted on campus, "No means yes. Yes means anal," (Culp-Ressler, 2014). This act deeply contributes to rape culture wherein sex crimes are trivialized, and sexual consent does not matter.

With campus sexual violence cast into the national spotlight, colleges and universities, non-profit organizations, and government agencies have created or influenced public policies intended to reduce sex crimes. Despite these interventions, campus sexual violence remains both an educational, legal, and public concern, with major interest groups holding various beliefs about future policy direction. However, major policy participants' belief systems are not always acknowledged or transparent in the literature, despite the influence those beliefs have on policy formation. Instead, most research on campus sexual violence public policy focuses on legal issues or institutional intervention, compliance, and response (Banyard, Moynihan, & Plante, 2007; Chmielewski, 2013; Coulter & Rankin, 2017; Elias-Lambert & Black, 2016; B.S. Fisher, Hartman, & Cullen, 2002; Foubert, 2000; Garcia, Lechner, Frerich, Lust, & Eisenberg, 2012; Griffin, Pelletier, Griffin, & Sloan, 2016; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Lund & Thomas, 2015; Senn et al., 2015; Yung, 2015). This article will provide an overview of campus sexual violence, review existing public policy, analyze major policy participants' belief systems using one component of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and conclude with a discussion of contentious policy issues that might need to be addressed to satisfy participants' belief systems.

Sexual Assault on College Campuses
Risk Factors
Researchers have identified several risk factors for sexual violence victimization and perpetration. Students are at higher risk for sexual assault as a result of other students' abuse of alcohol, as well as their own misuse (DeJong & Langford, 2002; Glider, Midyett, Mills-Novoa, Johannessen, & Collins, 2001; National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2002). Intoxication may incapacitate, rendering victims unable to consciously consent to sex or physically resist. In addition, Abbey, Ross, McDuffie, and McAuslan (2016) found that dating and sexual misperceptions were also related to sexual assault on campus. The researchers found that women who had not been victims of sexual violence less frequently reported that their sexual intentions were misperceived compared to women who

were victims of sexual violence. Regarding perpetration, males who reported more sexual media consumption, heavy episodic drinking, hypermasculinity, and being a peer circle that endorsed sexual violence were more likely to be perpetrators in college (Salazar et al., 2018; Tharp, DeGue, Brookmeyer, Massetti, & Matjasko, 2013). Risk factors for both victimization and perpetration appear to center around socially-constructed gender roles, dysfunctional communication, misconceptions of trust, and perceptions of masculinity.

Whether most campus sexual violence perpetrators are serial rapists is a question that remains hotly debated. In their landmark study, Lisak and Miller (2002) found that 6.4% of male students admitted to rape. Of those males, 63% admitted committing multiple rapes (Lisak & Miller, 2002). More recently, however, Swartout et al. (2015) found that only 25% of males who committed rape in college perpetuated multiple rapes across multiple college years. Further research is required to corroborate findings, as the acceptance of the serial rapist theory impacts methods of intervention. For example, the prevailing argument has been that if a majority of rapes are committed by a small number of individuals, then interventions should be targeted toward those individuals, theoretically resulting in a reduction of rape (Tharp et al., 2015). Interventions for serial rapists often consist of counseling for childhood sexual abuse, behavioral and cognitive therapy, group sessions, and prescription drugs (Maletzky, 2003). However, these treatments may not be as relevant to or effective for rapists who are not repeat offenders, highlighting the criticality of fully understanding who rapes and how to design interventions to reduce rape.

Consequences and Impact of Sexual Violence
Sexual violence victims suffer devastating short- and long-term emotional, medical, and academic consequences. They experience higher rates of depression, self-harm, anxiety, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and substance abuse (Gonzalez & Feder, 2016). In fact, about one half of college-aged victims who were raped meet criteria for PTSD, compared to 40% of the overall population (Kilpatrick, Resnick, Ruggiero, Conoscenti, & McCauley, 2007). Victims are also exposed to sexually transmitted diseases and female victims to unwanted pregnancies. Research has shown that victims may suffer from loss of focus and concentration, lower GPA, and poorer attendance, affecting academic persistence and achievement (Gonzalez & Feder, 2016; Jordan, Combs, & Smith, 2014). Ultimately, victims of sexual assault become at-risk students.

Campus Interventions
Colleges attempt to protect their students from victimization in various ways. As a result of federal requirements, many have created web portals that provide definitions of sexual

violence, reporting procedures, and support services. Colleges also provide educational programming aimed to decrease sexual violence on campus. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website lists three programs found to be effective at preventing violence perpetration, and four found to be promising ("Sexual Violence: Prevention Strategies," 2017). Of the three programs found to be effective, two are targeted at adolescents and one is a bystander intervention program. Of the four programs found promising, two are bystander education programs, one is targeted at adolescents, and one is targeted at high school athletes. Age-appropriate bystander intervention programs such as RealConsent, Bringing in the Bystander, and Green Dot that are used at colleges and universities have shown positive results (Coker et al., 2015; DeGue et al., 2014). Despite the role of alcohol in a majority of campus sexual violence incidents, alcohol education programs do not appear to produce sustainable changes in college students' drinking habits (Hayes, Abbott, & Cook, 2016; Henson, Pearson, & Carey, 2015).

While certain programs appear to be promising, one-time training is not adequate. Dosage or program intensity becomes a major factor when designing interventions. Elias-Lambert and Black (2016) found a significant decrease in sexually coercive intentions among fraternity males who participated in Bringing in the Bystander, but discovered that those intentions rebounded after several weeks. Similarly, Lonsway and Kothari (2000) found that a decrease in rape myth acceptance was short-lived after students completed a rape education program. Nation et al. (2003) found that the most effective programs provide periodic "booster sessions" after initial interventions to prolong and support outcomes (p. 452). The need for continued education undoubtedly places a huge financial and human resource burden on colleges and universities as they struggle to reach students in meaningful ways and compete with other demands.

Educational programs that empower individuals to resist sexual assault have also demonstrated effectiveness. Senn et al. (2015) implemented campus interventions designed to improve one's sexual assault risk assessment and psychological self-defense. They found that in the following year, incidents of rape for females who participated in the program were nearly 50% lower than the control group (Senn et al., 2015). Such educational programming should not be confused with physical self-defense instruction, which has not been found to be an effective measure of rape prevention (Carmody, 2006). Critics of self-education argue that these types of programs shift the burden of being safe to potential victims rather than addressing social norms, rape culture, and victim-blaming.

Review and Analysis of Public Policy

The last thirty years have been an important time for policy that specifically addresses sexual violence on college campuses. In 1990, Congress passed The Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (The Clery Act). That same year, work began on the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which was enacted in 1994. Both Acts were reauthorized in 2013 to clarify victims' rights, require campus educational programs, and refine campus investigatory procedures. Legislation implemented two decades earlier requiring colleges to provide an educational experience free of sex discrimination was the first regulation to create broad implications for campus sexual violence: Title IX. The following section describes these policies in more detail.

Title IX and the Office of Civil Rights' "Dear Colleague" Letter

Title IX was the outcome of a cadre of persistent policymakers in the 1970s. Rep. Edith Green took action after learning about the plight of Dr. Bernice Sandler, who flooded the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) with discrimination complaints after she was denied a faculty position due to her excessively "strong" female persona (Rose, 2015, p. 160). As chair of the Subcommittee on Higher Education, Rep. Green presided over hearings that convinced her that sex discrimination in higher education was a serious problem requiring government intervention ("History of the Violence Against Women Act," 2015). Armed with evidence, Green would garner support from Congressional leaders and external constituents to place the issue on the national agenda, taking advantage of a political climate that was already attentive to various forms of discrimination. The most obvious policy mechanism seemed to be an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, but opposition to this idea redirected her to the soon-to-expire Higher Education Act (Rose, 2015). Her proposal, known as Title IX, was included in the Higher Education Amendment Acts of 1972 and still applies to public colleges and universities that receive federal aid.

Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in those institutions, promoting equal opportunities and removing sex-based barriers for females. It proclaims, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (Title IX of the Higher Education Acts, 1972). Despite only being 37 words long, different interpretations have expanded Title IX's application from sex discrimination in college admissions to professional faculty conduct to sexual harassment.

In 2011, the U.S. Department of Education issued a "Dear Colleague" letter classifying sexual violence as a Title IX offense, providing insight into how the government was interpreting Title IX. The letter included a reminder that

higher education institutions receiving federal funds must appoint a coordinator responsible for Title IX complaints and compliance (Ali, 2011). One of the most important components was the requirement that institutions base guilt on a "preponderance of evidence" (i.e. 50.1% of evidence indicates chance of guilt), rather than a "clear and convincing standard" (Ali, 2011). Mass media criticized this evidential standard for violating accused students' due process rights, but an estimated 80% of colleges had already adopted the standard years before the "Dear Colleague" letter was disseminated (P. Berkowitz, 2011; Kissel, 2011). Law scholars published their widespread support of the standard, which was already used in other civil rights investigations (Chmielewski, 2013; Karjane, Fisher, & Cullen, 2002; Weizel, 2012). In 2014, OCR issued a 46-page FAQ to provide additional guidance for content within the 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter.

In September 2017, the administration issued an interim Q&A guidance while lawmakers revisited universities' legal responsibilities under Title IX. Most significantly, the 2017 guidance withdrew the 2011 "Dear Colleague" letter and associated 2014 FAQ. The withdrawal thus removed the "preponderance of evidence" requirement and allowed universities to return to using a "clear and convincing standard." The guidance also replaced a 60-day time limit for Title IX investigations with "no fixed time frame" (U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, 2017, p. 3). The current administration will hold an open public comment period prior to any regulatory changes.

The Clery Act

The 1990 Clery Act required universities that accept federal aid to annually report crimes occurring on or near campus property including rape, dating/domestic violence, and stalking (Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Statistics Act, 2013). The Act was a legislative response to the 1986 rape and murder of Jeanne Clery in her dorm room. Assisted by media coverage, other victims/allies, and family members, her parents formed a nonprofit campus watchdog group that first lobbied the state of Pennsylvania and then pressed the federal government for legislation to make campuses safer ("25 Years of Clery," 2015). Their influence succeeded in both cases, and the Clery Act is still in effect.

The Clery Act serves as an ex post facto indicator of crimes but does not prevent or reduce sexual violence on campus. Annual reports are to be made public so existing and potential students, parents, policymakers, and advocacy groups have a more accurate picture of crime on campus and can make informed decisions. However, not all parties are aware of the report's existence or how to access it. Additionally, colleges and universities might perceive the Clery Act as the end rather than the means: even if a crime is appropriately reported, college administrators might poorly handle the aftermath by providing inadequate support services to victims or failing to properly punish those found guilty.

Despite sanctions imposed on universities that misreport, the number of reported sex crimes is low. One year after the 2013 reauthorizations, colleges reported only 20,000 cases of sexual violence relative to 20 million enrolled college students (Gonzalez & Feder, 2016; Institute of Education Sciences, 2015). That same year, the government released the names of 55 universities being investigated for potential violations (U.S. Department of Education, 2014). By 2017, the list quadrupled to 223 colleges (N. Anderson, 2017). Researchers found that campus sexual violence estimates might be underreported by up to 44%, as some students—and colleges—are reluctant to report sexual violence for reasons including embarrassment/shame, reputational harm, fear of retaliation, and desire to protect the perpetrator (Gonzalez & Feder, 2016; Yung, 2015). In 2016, the U.S. Department of Education imposed a historic $2.4M fine against the Pennsylvania State College for its mishandling of sexual misconduct cases, sending a clear message that colleges and universities would be held accountable for satisfactorily investigating claims of sexual violence occurring on their campuses (U.S. Department of Education, 2016).

VAWA

In 1990, Senator Joe Biden led a four-year effort to criminalize violence against women. A major point of contention within the VAWA bill was whether victims of domestic violence should be allowed to sue their attackers, a civil right based on older laws that protected African Americans ("History of the Violence Against Women Act," 2015). The bill's language was revised to address the federal court's concern of docket overload but retained the civil rights provision, which was later overturned by the Supreme Court ("History of the Violence Against Women Act," 2015). VAWA remains the government's major legislative effort to reduce crimes against women by appropriating funding for sexual assault programs, trauma-informed training, and legal assistance for victims (Violence Against Women Act, 1994).

Not all individuals were covered under the original VAWA. A 2013 reauthorization of VAWA broadened protections for Native Americans, immigrants, the LGBT community, and college students (Violence Against Women Act, 1994). Colleges are now required to record and report incidents of dating violence, implement programs designed to prevent dating violence, and inform victims of their rights. Critically, the reauthorization retained the Act's original funding provisions that awards competitive grants to universities to reduce campus sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking ("Grant programs," 2017).

The Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act

The 2013 reauthorizations also included the Sexual

Violence Elimination Act (Campus SaVE Act, 2013) that broadens Clery Act crime reporting categories, modifies schools' handling of complaints, and no longer recommends campus education on sexual violence prevention but requires it (Campus SaVE Act, 2013). This educational requirement helped mobilize a widespread campaign to reduce rape culture as a way to prevent sexual violence on campus. Inter-campus movements such as Take Back the Night and The Clothesline Project allow survivors and allies to promote awareness of sexual violence, and bystander intervention programs designed to prevent interpersonal violence increased in popularity on college campuses (Lee, Caruso, Goins, & Southerland, 2003).

Like the requirement for Title IX coordinators, the Campus SaVE Act is an unfunded mandate. As states cut aid for higher education, the burden to fund rape prevention programs falls on institutions. Roin (1999) provided a compelling argument supporting unfunded mandates because they allow the government to pass legislation more easily by avoiding the perception of redistributive unfairness. However, policy participants may view unfunded mandates as purely symbolic efforts that lack true support. While these policies intend to provide a sense of campus security through prevention and mitigation of rape culture, the reality is that execution may be thin due to available resources.

Stalled or Failed Legislation

In 2015, three bills designed to prevent and reduce sex crimes on campus were introduced. Congress proposed the Safe Campus Act as an amendment to the Higher Education Act; this act would allow the wrongly accused to sue their schools in federal court, offer protection to witnesses if they were involved in unrelated infractions discovered during the course of the investigation, and require colleges to report sexual assault to police (Safko, 2016). Lacking widespread support, Congress then proposed the Fair Campus Act that eliminated the obligation to report campus sex crimes to police (New, 2015). Still, the Fair Campus Act stalled in Subcommittee. Finally, the Campus Accountability and Safety Act (CASA) would establish additional support services for victims, but opponents claimed the bill would reduce protection for accused individuals (Richardson, 2016). Once stalled in Committee, an April 2017 version of CASA was reintroduced that retained a controversial requirement to designate faculty and staff as Campus Security Authorities (CSAs), roles that are obligated to report a disclosed sex crime to the university's Title IX coordinator (McCaskill, 2017). Currently, federal policy only requires designated campus safety officials and those with "significant responsibilities" for students and activities to be CSAs, although State policy varies (Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Statistics Act, 2013). CASA 2017 also introduced penalties of up to

1% of a school's operating budgets for mishandling Title IX complaints and investigations. Finally, in November 2017, victim rights advocates were angered by a proposed update to the Higher Education Act that would allow colleges to delay or suspend sexual violence investigations if requested by police or prosecutors.

Participants' Roles in Policymaking

Public policymaking is complicated by the number of participants that influence legislation. Government officials, interest groups, the public, media, academia, and subject matter experts all may participate in the public policymaking process. Several approaches can be used to understand external groups' influences. One way to look at participants' influence is through group theory, which describes group struggle through a lens of access and dominance (Anderson, 2014). Rational choice theory posits that individuals will act in their own best self-interest if given the opportunity, thus inhibiting participant mobilization (Stone, 2011). Elite theory takes into account the values and preferences of only the governing few (Anderson, 2014). The next section, however, uses a tenet of Weible and Sabatier's (2007) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to analyze participant's influences based on their belief systems. ACF centers around the idea that people engage in politics to operationalize their beliefs (Cairney, 2015). As evidenced by the prevalence of rape culture, victim blaming, and rape myth acceptance, beliefs are an important factor when it comes to sex-based violence, and those beliefs inevitably pervade the policymaking process.

Advocacy Coalition Framework

ACF is a policymaking process designed to coordinate responses to deeply debated public policy problems (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). The framework was developed in response to limitations in current public policy literature by emphasizing scientific and technical data and assumes that beliefs are the causal driver of political behavior (Weible, Sabatier, & McQueen, 2009). ACF has been applied to policies addressing sports to tobacco to natural disasters, but a search of the literature indicates that it has never been applied to campus sexual violence (Weible & Sabatier, 2007).

The latest version of ACF is composed of four tenets to allow for a fluid and flexible process (Weible et al., 2009). The first tenet is the identification of policy subsystems, which are systems composed of various coalitions that share a common policy problem. The second tenet holds that participants in a coalition share belief systems, including deep, fundamental and largely immovable core beliefs, policy core beliefs that are firm but malleable in response to new evidence, and secondary beliefs about policy implementation that are narrower and more easily changeable. The third tenet discusses participatory action beyond the government-lobbyist-bureaucracy iron triangle

such as forming advocacy coalitions, identifying appropriate venues, relying upon brokers or mediators, and utilizing available resources. The fourth tenet describes mechanisms that produce change such as external shocks to the system, hurting stalemates, and the accumulation of scientific/technical evidence. An underlying assumption of ACF is that participants are rationally motivated and non-neutral and have access to places where their coalitions can influence policy (Weible & Sabatier, 2007).

This analysis focuses on the second tenet by examining the belief systems of participants involved in sexual violence policymaking in order to better understand their policy needs and demands. Much of the literature on campus sexual violence policy focuses on legal aspects and implications of policy, institutional compliance, and/or campus programming/interventions (Banyard, Moynihan, & Plante, 2007; Chmielewski, 2013; Coulter & Rankin, 2017; Elias-Lambert & Black, 2016; B.S. Fisher, Hartman, & Cullen, 2002; Foubert, 2000; Garcia, Lechner, Frerich, Lust, & Eisenberg, 2012; Griffin, Pelletier, Griffin, & Sloan, 2016; Lonsway & Kothari, 2000; Lund & Thomas, 2015; Senn et al., 2015; Yung, 2015. Examining policy participants' belief systems highlights contentious perspectives that may cause stalemates and also provides a preview of what a full ACF application might look like if applied to this problem. While it is beyond the scope of this article to list every advocacy coalition within this policy subsystem, the following section discusses the policymaking influence of three prominent groups: colleges and universities, the Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network (RAINN), and law enforcement agencies.

Examining Advocacy Coalitions' Belief Systems Regarding Campus Sexual Violence

College and Universities

Colleges and universities have been important policy participants since Title IX and continue to lobby for and against proposed policies related to campus sexual violence (Costain, 1978; Lebioda, 2015). These institutions embody deep core beliefs to educate students, prepare them for vocations, foster their personal development, and position them for upward social mobility and participation in civic society (Labaree, 1997; Langemann & Lewis, 2012). Although prioritization of these goals has changed over time, most colleges and universities offer students curricular and extracurricular experiences that provide both private and public benefits such as the ones stated above.

Many colleges and universities are vocal about their policy core beliefs related to investigatory jurisdiction of campus sexual violence. For example, Harvard's general counsel advised rape victims to contact local law enforcement agencies for assistance, as the college's internal judiciary board was not equipped to handle such

investigations (Anderson, 2004). Other colleges might desire to keep investigations at the college level in order to provide appropriate accommodations and support to victims, protect civil liberties, expedite investigations, and guard institutional reputations. As a middle option, some colleges hire outside adjudicators to handle investigations in conjunction with a college representative (Bauer-Wolf, 2017). Thus, colleges and universities handle Title IX investigations differently based on institutional preference, agenda, and capacity.

Colleges' secondary beliefs might manifest in how they respond to campus violence through federally mandated programming. As evidence emerges about the effectiveness of sexual violence prevention programs, colleges may shift their educational initiatives. Research has found males are generally resistant to direct interventions because they do not consider themselves as potential rapists (Scheel, Johnson, Schneider, & Smith, 2001). Rather than impressing upon students a dichotomous concept of potential victim or potential perpetrator, other programs emphasize the critical role of bystanders and witnesses in order to change attitudes about rape culture and responses to sexual violence.

RAINN

Nonprofit groups also influence public policy related to campus sexual violence. RAINN is the nation's largest anti-sexual violence coalition and retains close ties to government officials in the departments of Defense, Justice, Education, and Health & Human Services to influence policy ("Programs and Expertise," 2016). RAINN's deep core beliefs are demonstrated through their victim services, public education, and consulting services ("Programs and Expertise," 2016). Particular to sexual violence on campuses, RAINN allows students to rate their school's prevention programs, organizes an annual RAINN day to raise awareness, and connects schools with sexual violence survivors to speak at events ("Safety for students," 2018).

One of RAINN's policy core beliefs might be characterized through their public assertion that institutions should be required to report cases of sexual violence directly to law enforcement agencies and become partners in the investigation (S. Berkowitz & O'Connor, 2014). RAINN cites that colleges mishandle sexual violence cases (as might law enforcement) and takes issue with the fact that only 20% of all rapes are reported to police (S. Berkowitz & O'Connor, 2014; Sinozich & Langton, 2014). The number of rapes reported to law enforcement agencies is even lower for those that occur on campuses (Bonnie S. Fisher, Daigle, Cullen, & Turner, 2003). RAINN's stance is that sexual violence prevention is best accomplished by using the criminal justice system, thus advocating for full disclosure of campus sex crimes and meaningful sanctions for perpetrators and noncompliant institutions (S. Berkowitz

& O'Connor, 2014).

Like college and universities, RAINN's secondary core beliefs might be reflected in their support of sexual violence prevention programming. RAINN offers an online portal that allows colleges to enter information about their campus, target audience, and preferred mode of programming ("Prevention Navigator," 2018). Parameters are matched to a database of prevention programming, allowing colleges to choose the best fit for their campuses and students. However, RAINN does not endorse individual programs, allowing campuses to make decisions based on their needs ("FAQs," 2018).

Law Enforcement Agencies

According to the Department of Justice, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies are tasked with enforcing laws, preventing and detecting crimes, and conducting investigations into alleged crimes, duties that encompass their deep core beliefs (a discussion about the merit of laws they are tasked to uphold is beyond the scope of this paper) ("Law Enforcement," 2018). More than half of college campuses that enroll over 2,500 students have their own police force that supplements nonsworn campus security officers (Reaves, 2015). A majority of campus police departments in colleges with more than 5,000 students have dedicated personnel to address general crime, rape prevention, drug education, alcohol education, stalking, victim assistance, and intimate partner violence (Reaves, 2015). Thus, campus police units can operate similarly to their local law enforcement counterparts.

Law enforcement agencies also acknowledge that other investigatory bodies may be an adequate alternative to involving local police. As mentioned earlier, jurisdiction can be negotiated and formalized between investigatory groups such as campus judicial boards and local police, an example of a policy core belief embraced by law enforcement agencies (Reaves, 2015). As a result, local police may not be called to campus every time a student files a stalking or sexual harassment complaint. However, the existence and scope of such agreements varies by institution, and the effectiveness of such partnerships requires further analysis.

A secondary belief of law enforcement agencies might be conceptualized as stemming from the above-mentioned policy core belief, which is working in collaboration with colleges and universities to prevent and reduce campus sexual violence. Some colleges actively utilize local law enforcement in campus rape prevention efforts. The University of Seattle produced a tape depicting a male being raped by two other males used during programming targeted at fraternity men (Foubert, 2000). On other campuses, the presence and role of police may not be as prevalent. Interviews conducted by Garcia, Lechner,

Frerich, Lust, and Eisenberg (2012) indicated that students cited professors, residence assistances, health service providers, orientation facilitators, and wellness center staff as sources of education and educational programming providers, but not law enforcement agencies or campus security officers. Therefore, the extent of enforcement participation in campus sexual violence programming varies and is negotiated as part of the town-gown relationship.

Table 1
Analysis of Policy Participants' Belief Systems
Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework

	Deep core	Policy core	Secondary
Colleges and universities	Educate students for vocations, foster development, and position for social mobility and participation in society	Investigate claims of sexual violence at college level or hand cases over to law enforcement	Provide mandatory educational programming for campus sexual violence
RAINN	Reduce sexual violence and support victims	Report all campus sexual violence to law enforcement	Provide an online portal for campuses to identify appropriate programming
Law enforcement agencies	Enforce law and investigate when laws might be broken	Negotiate investigatory jurisdiction among investigatory bodies	Assume an active, supportive, or absent role in implementing campus sexual violence programming
Common ground	Advance society and protecting civil rights	Disputed – are of opportunity	Prevent sexual violence on campus through various interventions

Discussion

Contentions and commonalities emerged from the analysis of policy participants' belief systems and can provide insight into what campus sexual violence policies they might support based on these beliefs. Deep core and secondary core beliefs for all advocacy coalitions are similar in nature, but there is difference among policy core beliefs (Table 1). Deep core beliefs for all groups could be summarized as the desire to advance society and protect civil rights. Secondary beliefs that relate to policy implementation are more likely to change as new evidence emerges, but the various forms of sexual violence prevention currently offered on college campuses does not appear to cause conflict among the coalitions. Two main areas of contention

did emerge among policy participants' policy core beliefs: 1) who is responsible for investigating campus sexual violence and 2) whether campus sexual violence must be reported to law enforcement agencies. This section provides one example of how policy participants might begin to find common ground during the policymaking process by acknowledging differences among their underlying belief systems.

Jurisdiction for Investigating Campus Sexual Violence

One of the most contentious policy core belief issues among advocacy coalitions is who should manage campus sexual violence investigations. Because Title IX encompasses a broad range of protections, investigations range from complaints of rape to student newspaper columns that satirize stalking. Compromises should be explored that would satisfy parties, such as assigning investigations based on crime classification. For example, law enforcement might not be contacted to investigate incidents of sexual harassment on campus, as colleges might be better positioned to respond to incidents by improving campus culture and providing targeted interventions. Law enforcement could, however, manage investigations of rape and physical violence allegations. This arrangement permits university judicial boards to determine punishments for some incidents while sanctions for others would be handled by the legal system.

Colleges could also retain investigatory control over complaints that involve issues such as freedom of speech and academic freedom. Complaints of sexual harassment, for example, may intersect with academic freedom. Faculty who use sexually explicit images, videos, or texts as teaching tools can find themselves the subject of a Title IX complaint regardless of whether they felt the tools were appropriate. Kipnis (2015) coined the controversial phrase "sexual paranoia" to describe an academic environment wherein "exquisitely sensitive" college students are likened to walking, breathing, potential Title IX cases (n.p.). Being accused of a Title IX violation can harm—sometimes irreversibly—careers, personal wellbeing, and reputations, and college officials who are knowledgeable about their personnel may be best equipped to handle these types of investigations.

Sharing investigative duties could certainly evoke secondary issues, such as conflicts over jurisdiction, dissatisfaction with outcomes, or strained town and gown relationships. Relationship building would be critical for a successful partnership. Similar collaborations already exist on many campuses, paving the path for more streamlined investigations into incidents of campus sexual violence. Nonprofit groups like RAINN could work directly with law enforcement and colleges to provide support services, gap-bridging education, and training for both campus and law officials alike. This effort would undoubtedly require commitment and resources from federal and private agencies that are already stretched thin.

Mandatory Reporting of Campus Sexual Violence to Law Enforcement

The question of whether to eliminate a victim's option to report to law enforcement has no easy solution but is a major area of contention among policy participants. Victims' decisions to report rape to law enforcement is dependent on factors such as age, race/ethnicity, and education level but also trust in law enforcement. Fisher et al. (2003) noted that 30% of rape victims did not report to the police because they did not feel the crime would be taken seriously, while 20% felt the police did not want to be bothered. Du Mont, Miller, and Myhr (2003) found that rapes are more likely to be reported to police if physical force was used and the rape resulted in physical injury, characteristics that do not describe the majority of campus sexual assaults. Paul, Zinzow, McCauley, Kilpatrick, and Resnick (2014) found that victims were more likely to report rape to law enforcement if encouraged and supported by others, suggesting that not being taken seriously is a major inhibitor of reporting to police.

Requiring that cases of sexual violence be reported to law enforcement presents a number of challenges. Sexual violence crimes, particularly of the nature that are most prevalent on college campuses, are challenging cases for law enforcement, with only about 12.5% resulting in a conviction (Westera, Kebbell, & Milne, 2016). In addition, a systematic analysis indicated that police show low frequencies of victim blaming and rape myth acceptance, and complexities such as intoxication may reduce perception of victim credibility (Sleath & Bull, 2017; Venema, 2016). Ensuring that every complaint of sexual violence is taken seriously would require significant resources to form training partnerships between law enforcement agencies and nonprofits like RAINN. The feasibility of resources needed to work through cases with such a low conviction rate would need to be considered and addressed during the policymaking process.

Conclusion

Campus sexual violence persists as a public problem despite legislation that has raised awareness such as Title IX, the Clery Act, VAWA, and the Campus SaVE Act. Students lack education about what sexual consent looks like and when it can be obtained. College administrators have been accused of underreporting sexual violence on campus and mishandling investigations to protect their school's reputation. Perpetrators are often lightly punished—if punished at all—leaving victims to wonder why the system has failed them. Society has normalized victim-blaming and rape culture by focusing on how alcohol or outfits might have attracted sexual advances, instead of simply examining whether an individual consciously

consciously consented. The father of a convicted Stanford rapist claimed his son's six month jail sentence was a "steep price for twenty minutes of action," hinting that rape culture does not start—or end—on campus (Miller, 2016). Public policy must challenge college administrators, students, parents, community members, and interest groups to re-shape social norms.

Policymaking is complicated by the number of participants that influence policy and their reasons for doing so. One aspect of the Advocacy Coalition Framework can be used a lens for understanding how participants engage in public policymaking based on their belief systems. A majority of research on campus sexual violence focuses on legal issues, prevalence of sexual violence incidents, or campus interventions and responses. However, this paper argued that understanding policy participants' belief systems is crucial to the policy formation process. Analysis suggests that colleges and universities, the nonprofit interest group RAINN, and law enforcement share many of the same deep core and secondary beliefs but exhibit different policy core beliefs. This article suggests that advocacy coalitions should focus their efforts on exploring major points of contention including jurisdiction over investigating campus sexual violence and whether campus sexual violence should automatically be reported to law enforcement. Finding, negotiating, and capitalizing on shared beliefs has the potential to increase advocacy coalitions' support of meaningful federal policy, providing a long-term vehicle for policy stability that may aid in reducing rape and rape culture on college campuses

Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine by Elizabeth Popp Berman.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012. ix, 265 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. Reviewed by Christie Hand, West Virginia University

Introduction

Elizabeth Popp Berman is associate professor of sociology at the University of Albany, State University of New York. Creating the Market University: How Academic Science Became an Economic Engine, Berman's first book, won the 2013 Max Weber Book Award from the Organizations, Occupations, and Work Section of the American Sociological Association; the 2012 Pierre Bourdieu Award for Best Book from the Sociology of Education Section of the American Sociological Association; and the 2011 President's Book Award from the Social Science History Association. It is indeed a work deserving of much acclaim given its meticulous scholarship and astute conclusions. The purpose of Berman's study was to determine why market logic has become more influential in academic science over the past several decades, focusing in particular on the 1950s through 1990s. Through an in-depth historical analysis engaging the fields of science, technology, economics, and politics, Berman traces the evolution of science within higher education, from that of pure science (science for science sake) to that of market-driven science. The book concludes on a very rational note, acknowledging significant scientific progress which would not have been possible without a market focus and yet lamenting the loss of pure scientific research for the common good.

Market Logic

In Berman's quest to determine why market logic has become so influential in academic science over the past several decades, she analyzed the relationship of the university and industry and how that suddenly changed in the 1970s. She concluded that changes in government policies were largely responsible for this shift, as innovation in science and technology was recognized as a way to stimulate a sluggish economy Her argument clearly demonstrates a strategic partnership between the government and higher education, leading to significant innovation in both science and technology and resulting in the dissemination of discoveries that may not have otherwise been made. In fact, the logic is so well presented that even a liberal (albeit functionalist) reader could be convinced of the merits of such policies as reduction in capital gains taxes and deregulation.

Berman begins the book by exploring two types of institutional logic which are relevant to higher education: science logic, which is the traditional university approach, and market logic, which reflects the university's relationship with industry. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the role that academic science played was a "science-as-resource" model (p. 29) in which industry would use the science that universities provided as long as it was relevant and helpful. This model worked for universities because they were still getting

significant funding from the federal government and so did not need to become economic actors themselves. Science departments and labs were still benefiting from the postwar levels of funding which were essentially unrestricted; professors could conduct science for science sake with little accountability. By the late 1960s, however, this unfettered government support began to erode with worries about inflation and threats of recession. Universities no longer received as much "free money" and the government began to expect scientific research with promise of application, particularly financially beneficial application. Thus, science logic gradually turned to a market logic and a "science-as-engine" model (p. 30).

Three market-driven practices

Berman dedicates most of the book to three specific practices in academic science which demonstrate the evolution to market logic: 1) faculty entrepreneurship in the biosciences; 2) the patenting of university inventions;

3) the creation of university industry research centers. In each of these changes, she presents extensive research and documentation, guiding the reader through the shifts in government policy and opinion to the market-based position. In fact, she says that behind these three changes, there were ten government policy decisions, nine of which are directly linked to innovation and its economic impact. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government began to see innovation as a primary solution to a sagging economy and started to implement deregulatory policies removing barriers to innovation. Innovation was present earlier, but experiments were not widespread because of the more regulated political environment.

The first practice that Berman describes, faculty entrepreneurship, is traced to Robert Sinsheimer's 1967 discovery of the synthesis of self-replicating viral DNA, which led to Stanford professor Stanley Cohen's 1973 attempt to create hybrid DNA molecules without the help of viruses. This caught the attention of Congress and the rest of the world, beginning the roller-coaster journey of recombinant DNA (rDNA) over the next several years as politicians, scientists in higher education and industry, and venture capitalists considered the risks and benefits of genetic engineering. Further breakthroughs, such as the discovery of insulin and the founding of new startup companies, were made possible through government policy decisions to not regulate rDNA research (opening the door to innovation and entrepreneurship), to cut capital gains taxes (providing incentives for venture capitalists), and to allow the investment of pension funds in venture capital.

As with faculty entrepreneurship, Berman approaches changes in the patenting of university inventions largely from the perspective of government policy. She highlights the 1980 University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act (better known as the Bayh-Dole Act, named after the two Senators who promoted it) as the landmark legislation which opened the door to patents. She also notes the 1980 Diamond v. Chakrabarty Supreme Court case, which permitted microorganisms to be patented, and the creation in 1982 of the Court Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), which heard all patent appeals. Throughout the technical discussion, Berman also acknowledges that in these decisions there was an inherent conflict of interest between academic capitalism (Slaughter, 1997) and the view that knowledge should be for the good of society. The government also played an economic-inspired role in Berman's third market-logic practice, the creation of University-Industry Research Centers (UIRCs). UIRCs seem commonplace now as a physical location where university and industry scientists can collaborate and where academic knowledge is applied directly to industry. Initial experiments with research parks, though, were not very successful due to lack of funding and the cultural divide between academia and industry. The big break for UIRCs came with a shift in economic development policy at the state level, changing from an emphasis on supply-side (business is attracted through incentives such as tax breaks and subsidies) to a demand-side (growth comes through innovation and a competition for resources). This type of economic development led states to invest in industry-university collaboration much more than they had before.

After the in-depth description of these three practices, Berman reiterates the impact that that government policy has on each. Policy changes created the right climate for faculty entrepreneurship and patenting of university inventions. Additionally, policy changes, particularly at the state level, resulted in direct government funding which enabled University-Industry Research Centers to scale up. This then strengthens her market logic argument: academic science became an economic engine itself and not just a resource for industry; because academic science could create innovation, it also had the power to drive the economy.

Neoliberalism and Economic Realism
Through this book and her extensive research, Berman has demonstrated the extent to which higher education, the government, industry, and the economy intersect. The point of intersection in this case is academic science which she meticulously traces through five decades (1950s -1990s), showing how science has evolved as a resource for industry to how science has become a driver for industry and the economy. Along the way, she explores the political climate and policy decisions which open doors for further scientific innovation. It becomes clear that policy decisions are largely driven by the state of the economy and by the need to remain competitive in a global marketplace. As Berman notes, innovation was the motivation behind a majority of the policy decisions; this was how the government intended to remain competitive.

Berman, however, has not been swept away by the sea of neo-liberalism. Through her analysis of the three practices, she seeks to explain why they happened but does not resolve the debate about which type of logic is better. She cites Henry Giroux's arguments that neoliberalism is a threat to the true mission of higher education—that the university has been reduced to a market-controlled institution. Berman acknowledges that some factors contributing to the evolution in academic science reflect neoliberalism, such as the capital gains tax cut, loosening patent regulations, and changing investment rules for pension funds. Other factors, however, do not. The government subsidies for University-Industry Research Centers are not reflective of neoliberal ideology, and the driving motivation behind the developments in academic science was not to limit government intervention or promote free market. Rather, this was a natural flow of events when the pursuit of innovation became a priority for

the government.

Because of these differences in intention, Berman views economic rationalism, rather than neoliberalism, as a more appropriate lens through which to view the shift to market logic. She cites Max Weber's work in economic rationalism as "action undertaken because it is seen as the most effective means to achieve a given end" (p. 175). This to her is a more accurate description of what happened in academic science during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. The policy decisions which contributed to the move from science logic to market logic were prompted by the belief that by pursuing innovation, the economy would strengthen. In other words, the policy changes reflecting a neoliberal agenda were the means not the end. Berman, however, concludes the book saying "ultimately, then, I find myself ending this book on an ambivalent note" acknowledging that even as economic rationalism produces gains, something is lost when we only measure value in economic terms (p. 177). She admits that innovation-oriented policy decisions focus only on the economic value of science and technology, disregarding the value of knowledge in solving social problems. After the depth of scrutiny supporting market logic arguments, it is refreshing that Berman does not attempt to oversimplify a complex and nuanced issue.

Conclusion

Regardless of a person's political or philosophical persuasion, the economic rationalism argument found in Creating the Market University gives much reason for critical reflection. Most likely, no one would argue against the value of insulin, which was largely a result of faculty entrepreneurship. This and many other inventions and innovations have definitely contributed to the good of society and may not have been possible without economic incentives. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Berman still feels that tug of conscience which causes her concluding ambivalence. It is a recognition that we do lose something when society, and in the process higher education, is reduced to economic incentives.

Through Berman's skillful integration of academic, economic, and political influences, the reader will be challenged to think about higher education in new ways. Her analysis reflects a depth of historical research, carefully navigating progressive milestones in academic science and the accompanying policy decisions. When the examination of issues becomes almost too detailed, which can at times lead to tedious reading, she backs up and returns to the research question, allowing the reader to refocus. Her purpose was to determine why market logic has become more influential in academic science over several decades in mid-late 20th century. She succeeded. She also succeeds in challenging the reader to critically think through the impact of market logic on higher education today. Her discussion largely stops

with the 1990s because this was the period relevant to her argument. If Berman publishes a second edition, an appendix or a subsequent chapter addressing the present day would be helpful. Nevertheless, the lessons of this book are far-reaching as higher education will always be subject to forces in the surrounding environment. The university is not the ivory tower, nor is it Wall Street, but maybe it can take the best of both worlds.

Slaughter, S. (1997). Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.